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I. INTRODUCTION
In the brutally hot summer of 2001, three prominent athletes lost their
lives on playing fields across the country. Football players Korey Stringer
of the Minnesota Vikings,' Rashidi Wheeler of Northwestern University,
2
and Eraste Autin of the University Florida3 collapsed and died in summer
practices. These practices are an annual rite that has preceded each foot-
ball season since the sport was conceived approximately ninety years ago.
While these deaths are tragic, they are certainly not uncommon. Since
1995, eighteen high school and collegiate football players have died while
participating in practices or games. In America's litigious society, these
deaths raise important questions regarding a coach's responsibility to the
team and his players. Specifically, should a coach be held personally li-
able when his athlete is injured or dies while participating in an athletic
event?
Throughout the history of American athletics, the coach has filled a
special role for the individual athlete and the team. A coach is responsible
for organizing, directing, and motivating athletes to perform at their
maximum potential. Names like Vince Lombardi, Yogi Berra, Pat Riley,
and even Steve Spurrier and Bobby Bowden evoke images of greatness.
Winning coaches at the collegiate and professional levels are richly com-
pensated for their efforts to produce champions. For example, Korey
Stringer's coach, Dennis Green, earns approximately three million dollars
a year as the head coach of the Minnesota Vikings;5 Eraste Autin's coach,
Steve Spurrier, earned over two million dollars a year as head football
coach of the University of Florida.'
Winning coaches often achieve results through techniques that could
legally be considered 'wanton' or 'grossly negligent' in any other context.
Bear Bryant, widely considered one of the greatest college football
coaches of all time, conducted such a brutal training camp in his first
1. Don Pierson, Death of an NFL Player, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 2, 2001, at 1.
2. Asthma Is Cited as Cause of Death for Northwestern Player, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Aug. 5, 2001, at D12.
3. Joe Schad, Wake Up Call with 2 Deaths in the Off Season, the State's College Football
Coaches See Changes Ahead, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 30, 2001, at Cl. Florida State University's
football program also suffered the death of a player, Devaughn Darling, in a February conditioning
drill. Id.
4. Football Casualty List, NEWSDAY, Aug. 2, 2001, at A85.
5. John Harper, Giants Load Up on Fassel Fuel, Retain Coach for 4 Years, $10.7M, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Feb. 28, 2001, at 58.
6. Norman Arey, Football Coaches' Salaries, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 1, 2000, at 1.
Bobby Bowden, who coached the late Devaughn Darling, makes a million and a half dollars a year
coaching the Seminoles of Florida State University. Id.
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coaching season that seventy-six of one hundred and eleven players quit.7
When one player collapsed from dehydration, Bryant kicked him and or-
dered the other players to drag him off the field.' There was no emergency
response team present, so the student trainer drove the player to the hospi-
tal in his own car.9 Vince Lombardi, a two-time Super Bowl champion
coach, ran his Green Bay Packers through 'ungodly' conditioning work-
outs. ° One player lost eighteen pounds in the first two days of training
camp, and eventually collapsed of heatstroke."1
On its face, the behavior of such coaches seems barbaric and outra-
geous, but society seems to condone or ignore it because it forges football
champions. In a strictly legal sense, where does society draw the line be-
tween forging champions and committing a tort? When does a coach's
behavior constitute a tort and what standard should be applied? This arti-
cle analyzes the liability of a coach for an athlete's injury or death while
participating in an athletic event.12 In particular, the article describes the
theory of negligence as applied to an athletic coach, as well as other theo-
ries of liability and legal defenses a coach may employ. The article con-
cludes by applying these theories to the circumstances surrounding the
deaths of Stringer, Wheeler, and Autin.
II. A COACH'S LIABILITY FOR THE DEATH OF A PROFESSIONAL ATHLETE
As a general matter, injuries suffered by professional athletes on the
playing or practice field are no different from a legal point of view than
those suffered by other employees, such as an auto worker in a plant. In-
jury or death suffered by an employee is usually subject to the workers'
compensation law of the state where the employee is employed. In the
case of Korey Stringer, Minnesota workers' compensation law governs li-
ability issues regarding his death.' 3 Under Minnesota law, as in most ju-




11. Dufresne, supra note 7. The experience at Lombardi's camp was described as "throbbing,
aching, piercing, dizzy, screaming, vomiting, fear-inducing and fear-conquering pain." Id. at 2. Mi-
raculously, nobody died in the Lombardi or Bryant training camps.
12. This article analyzes coaches' liability in all sports, but football provides some of the most
notable examples, given the recent rash of activity-related deaths and the violent nature of the game
itself.
13. James Walsh, State Law Minimizes Chance of Litigation, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., Aug.
3, 2001, at 12C. However, states differ widely on their approach to the coverage of professional ath-
letes under workers' compensation schemes. For example, professional athletes are specifically ex-
cluded from coverage under the Florida Workers' Compensation Act. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
440.02(17)(c)(3) (West 2001).For an important discussion of the various approaches taken by differ-
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risdictions, employers and co-workers are shielded from liability for an
employee's death or injury except where 'gross negligence' or 'intentional
harm' can be proved.' 4  This is likely to be difficult to establish in
Stringer's case, because training in extreme heat is a common practice in
professional football, and because Stringer's reaction to it was extremely
unusual. 5
Without a showing of gross negligence or intentional harm, Stringer's
widow will recover only what is provided for under Minnesota's workers'
compensation statute. 6 Under the workers' compensation statute, a sur-
viving spouse with a child in Minnesota receives more than sixty-six per-
cent of the employee's pay, but the amount is capped.' 7  The state also
pays $15,000 toward burial costs."
Even if Stringer's widow were to sue the coach and the team, the CBA
would require that disputes between player and team be submitted to arbi-
tration. Case law has upheld the arbitration clause even in matters regard-
ing wrongful death or career-ending injuries. In Ellis v. Rocky Mountain
Empire Sports 9 the plaintiff was a professional football player who suf-
fered a career-ending knee injury in a practice session.2 ° The plaintiff sued
his team, the head coach, and the team physician, alleging that they had
negligently and intentionally allowed him to participate in a dangerous
contact drill.2' The trial court granted the defendants' summary judgment
motions, holding that the plaintiffs claims were barred, first because the
plaintiff failed to comply with the mandatory arbitration clause of his stan-
dard player's contract, and second because the claims were barred under
ent states on this issue, and an argument that contractual and statutory limitations on the professional
athlete's ability to collect workers' compensation benefits are "inherently unfair and grounded in
meritless arguments," see Stephen Cormac Carlin & Christopher M. Fairman, Squeeze Play: Work-
ers' Compensation and the Professional Athlete, 12 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 95 (Fall
1994/Spring 1995).
14. Id. Workers' compensation schemes generally provide exclusive remedies to injured em-
ployces, but are often drafted or interpreted not to bar a tort action against an employer or a co-
employee for intentional acts that cause injury. For the many permutations of this general proposi-
tion, see generally ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 103 (2001).
15. Walsh, supra note 13.
16. Id.
17. Id. Stringer's widow will receive $750 a week for the next thirty years from the work-
ers'compensation fund. Id. She will also receive the benefits of Stringer's life insurance, annuities,
and 401(k) plan, as well as his entire salary for his last season, which was contracted for under the
National Football League's (NFL's) Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"). Id.
18. Id.
19. 602 P.2d 895 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979).
20. Id. at 896.
21. Id.
[Vol. 13
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the Colorado Workmen's Compensation Act.22 The issues on appeal were
whether the arbitration clause of the player's agreement was enforceable
against the plaintiff and whether the trial court had properly interpreted the
workers' compensation statute.23
The court rejected the plaintiffs claim that the arbitration clause was
unconscionable, noting the law's preference for arbitration when it is pro-
vided for in collective bargaining agreements,2' and discussing the fact that
there was no "serious disparity of bargaining power" between the players'
association and the League's member clubs during the bargaining over the
standard player contract.25 The plaintiff was "bound by his union's deci-
sion. 26 The appeals court thus affirmed the lower court's judgment re-
garding the enforceability of the arbitration clause.27
Next the court analyzed the plaintiffs claims regarding the state's
workers' compensation act.28 In assessing the Colorado statute, the court
concluded that the act's scope included both the intentional torts of co-
employees and the negligence of the employer.29 The appellate court af-
firmed the judgment of the lower court, holding that the plaintiff's exclu-
sive remedy was provided for under the Workmen's Compensation Act.3°
The rationale of the Ellis case also extends to professional baseball. In
Bayless v. Philadelphia National League Club,3 the plaintiff, a profes-
sional baseball player, sued his team for allegedly providing negligent
medical care.32 The court noted that under the relevant state workers'
22. Id.
23. Ellis, 602 P.2d at 896.
24. Id. at 897 (citing United Steel Workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960)).
25. Id. at 897.
26. Id. For a discussion of disability benefits provided to NFL players, see Courson v. Bert
Bell NFL Player Retirement Plan, 214 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2000).
27. Ellis, 602 P.2d at 897.
28. Id. at 897-98.
29. Id. at 898. The intentional tort alleged was intentional infliction of emotional distress and
outrageous conduct. Id. In Colorado the workers' compensation statute provides for exclusive
remedies against employers complying with its provisions; all other common-law and statutory ac-
tions for deaths and injuries arising out of the course of employment were abolished. Id., citing Pack-
aging Corp. of America v. Roberts, 455 P.2d 652, 654 (Colo. 1969); see also the current statute,
COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-41-102 (2002). As to intentional acts committed by employees, respondeat
superior liability (whether covered under the workers' compensation act or not) will attach if such
acts occur during the "course of employment"; if they have "no real connection" with the employer's
business and are "purely personal," the employer is not liable (but the tortfeasor employees may be).
Packaging Corp. of America, 455 P.2d at 655, citing T. SHEARMAN & A. REDFIELD, LAW OF
NEGLIGENCE § 158 (1941, Supp. 1969).
30. Id.
31. 472 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
32. Id. at 627.
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compensation act, "an employee's common law right to damages for inju-
ries suffered in the course of his employment ... is completely surren-
dered in exchange for the exclusive statutory right of the employee to
compensation for all such injuries."33 The court dismissed the plaintiffs
action, holding that his exclusive remedy was to be had under the state
workers' compensation act.34 Courts have also noted that where there is an
intentional-injury exception to the exclusive remedy of state workers'
compensation, it is 'very narrow.'35 Thus, it appears that except for a lim-
ited range of intentional torts, a coach's liability for the injury or death of a
player is precluded by state workers' compensation laws, where applica-
ble, and arbitration clauses under collective bargaining agreements.36
III. LIABILITY OF COLLEGIATE AND HIGH SCHOOL COACHES
A. Negligence-Based Liability
While professional coaches in major organized sports are shielded by
collective bargaining agreements and workers' compensation statutes,
coaches at the high school and college levels do not enjoy the same level
of protection. Most suits against these coaches for sports related injuries
are predicated upon the theory of negligence.3 7 As in all cases, the plain-
tiff must prove (1) that the defendant owed a duty to conform to a standard
of conduct established by law for the protection of the plaintiff, (2) that the
defendant breached that duty; (3) that the defendant's breach was the legal
cause of the plaintiffs injury; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered com-
pensable injury.38 Generally, coaches have a duty to exercise reasonable
33. Id. at 628.
34. Id. at 631. In the absence of statutory or contractual limitations, courts in general "correctly
presume" that professional athletes are protected by workers' compensation programs. Cormac &
Fairman, supra note 13, at 104-05. See, e.g., Brinkman v. Buffalo Bills Football Club, 433 F. Supp.
699 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (professional football player's sole remedy for negligent medical treatment
was under the workers' compensation statute). As to the interpretation of "intentional tort" in the
workers' compensation context, see LARSON, supra note 14.
35. DePiano v. Montreal Baseball Club, Ltd., 663 F. Supp. 116, 117 (W.D. Pa. 1987).
36. But see In re Anaheim Angels Baseball Club, Inc., 993 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999)
(club's failure to provide competent medical care to minor league player was not subject to arbitra-
tion under the parties' contract); Hendy v. San Diego Chargers Football Co., 925 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir.
1991) (state law tort claims for negligent hiring of team physician, and for misrepresenting player's
fitness to play, arose solely under state law and independently of the collective bargaining agreement,
and thus were not subject to arbitration).
37. Jack E. Karns, Negligence and Secondary School Sports Injuries in North Dakota: Who
Bears the Legal Liability? 62 N.D.L. REV. 455, 460 (1986).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965); see also PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 30 at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
[Vol. 13
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care to prevent foreseeable risks of harm to others.39 Prevailing case law
has imposed numerous duties on coaches, including the duty of supervi-
sion, proper training, providing adequate medical care, and the warning of
latent dangers.4 °
1. Difficulty in Establishing the Applicable Standard of Care
As these principles are fleshed out by state courts around the country,
the holdings suggest that the determination of a coach's duty in a given
circumstance requires a fact-intensive analysis. In fact, the coach's stan-
dard of care owed to the athlete is often the most difficult element for the
plaintiff to establish. The Nebraska Supreme Court recently addressed the
issue of the standard of care that a coach owes a player in Cerny v. Cedar
Bluffs Junior/Senior Public School.41 In Cerny, the plaintiff, a high school
football player, suffered successive head injuries in a game and in practice
the following week.42 The plaintiff sued his school and his coach, claim-
ing that they had negligently permitted him to keep playing despite evi-
dence of the two closed-head injuries.43  The lower court held that the
school district and coaches were not liable and the plaintiff appealed.
44
The issue before the Nebraska Supreme Court was the proper standard of
care that the coaches and school owed the plaintiff regarding his head inju-
ries and continued participation on the team.45
The court noted that the analysis of negligence in a sports setting is
highly dependent on the particular facts and circumstances.46 The court
found that the plaintiffs coaches had Nebraska teaching certificates with
coaching endorsements, which required training in first aid instruction and
familiarization with the symptoms of closed-head injuries.47 Accordingly,
the coaches owed the plaintiff the standard of care of "the reasonably pru-
39. McCaskey and Biedzynski, A Guide to the Legal Liability of Coaches for a Sports Partici-
pant's Injuries, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 7, 14 (1996).
40. Id. at 15. Other duties include preventing injured athletes from competing, ensuring the
proper use of safe equipment, and matching athletes of similar competitive levels. Id. See also
Leahy v. School Board of Hernando County, 450 So.2d 883, 885 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (citing
Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Tort Liability of Public Schools and Institutions of Higher Learning
for Accidents Occurring During School Athletic Events, 35 A.L.R. 3d 725, 734 (1971) for the same
proposition).
41. 628 N.W.2d 697 (Neb. 2001).
42. Id. at 700.
43. Id. at 700-01.
44. Id. at 700.
45. Cerny, 628 N.W.2d at 703.
46. Id. at 704. "[N]egligence and the duty to use care do not exist in the abstract, but must be
measured against a particular set of facts and circumstances." Id.
47. Id. at 705-06.
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dent person holding a Nebraska teaching certificate with a coaching en-
dorsement., 48 The court found that the lower court had applied an im-
proper standard of care based on regional requirements, instead of the re-
quirements of the state.49 Because the lower court applied the improper
standard, the court reversed and remanded the case for a determination un-
der the correct standard.5°
2. The Coach's Duty to Protect Players From Foreseeable Risks
Even if the plaintiff can demonstrate the standard of care to be fol-
lowed by the defendant coach, he may still have difficulty proving the
other elements of negligence. In Prejean v. East Baton Rouge Parish
School Board," plaintiff was the mother of an elementary school basket-
ball player, Harvey, who suffered a severe injury when a fellow player fell
on him after being accidentally bumped by a coach during a drill. 2 The
coach, a twenty-seven-year-old male, had participated in a scrimmage with
his elementary school-aged players. 3 As Harvey, one other player, and
the coach all ran for a loose ball during the drill, the coach bumped into
the other player, who fell on Harvey's leg, fracturing it. 4 The plaintiff
sued the school and the volunteer coaches. " The trial court found that by
participating in the scrimmage and by attempting to recover the loose ball
in the way he had, the coach had breached his duty to protect Harvey from
foreseeable harm. 6
The appellate court reversed.57 The court held that the coach's partici-
pation in the scrimmage, and his attempt to recover the loose ball, had not
created a risk of injury greater than that generally presented in playing
basketball, and Harvey's injury, the result of an "unfortunate accident,"
was thus not foreseeable as a result of the coach's conduct in practicing
with the team or in attempting to retrieve the ball.58 Therefore the coach
48. Id. at 706.
49. Cerny, 628 N.W.2d at 706. The district court stated that it would not hold a coach to the
level of diagnostic capability of a medical care provider, but rather to that of a coach untrained in
medical affairs, which the district court said would be applicable to "communities similar to" the
town where this case arose. Id. at 705.
50. Id.
51. 729 So. 2d 686 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 687.
54. Id.
55. Prejean, 729 So. 2d at 686.
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had not breached his duty "to supervise his players in a reasonable manner
and to protect the players from foreseeable harm."'59
3. Although Difficult, a Coach's Negligence May Be Established
Although it is a formidable burden to establish the elements of negli-
gence, it is not impossible. Courts have found coaches negligent for fail-
ing to properly supervise and instruct athletes, as in Moose v. Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology,60 and for failing to provide proper medical
care to an injured player, as in Mogabgab v. Orleans Parish School
Board.6' In Moose, the plaintiff was a pole vaulter on his college track and
field team.61 Under the supervision of his two coaches, the plaintiff suf-
fered a fractured skull after executing a pole vault maneuver in practice.63
He sued the coaches and school, claiming that the coaches negligently su-
pervised his pole vault and provided him faulty equipment.64 He obtained
a jury award and the defendants appealed the verdicts.65 On appeal, one
issue was the foreseeability of the plaintiff's injury.66
The appeals court affirmed the lower court's judgments, holding that
the evidence before the jury was sufficient for it to find that the risk of in-
jury to the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable by the defendants. 67 First,
the coaches were aware that numerous vaulters had bounced off of the
landing pit because it was too short.68 Additionally, the coaches failed to
place additional padding around the pit on the day of the accident, al-
though this safety measure was available and they had done so in the
past.69 Furthermore, the supervising coach had the plaintiff perform with a
training pole, which was too light to support his weight.7 ° Then, after at
least one vault, the coach saw that the plaintiffs overpenetration on land-
ing indicated that he should either "use a heavier pole, raise his grip, or
shorten his approach run," but the coach did not warn the plaintiff to make
59. Prejean, 729 So. 2d at 689.
60. 683 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997).
61. 239 So.2d 456 (La. Ct. App. 1970).
62. Moose, 683 N.E.2d at 709.
63. Id. at 709-10.
64. Id. at 708.
65. Id.
66. Moose, 683 N.E.2d at 710.
67. Id. at 710-11.
68. Id. at 709. The landing pit met the NCAA-mandated minimum, but was shorter than the
recommended length. Id. A budgeting crisis at the school had prevented the coaches from being
able to buy new equipment. Id.
69. Id.
70. Moose, 68 N.E.2d at 709.
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any of these adjustments before the fateful vault.7' On these facts, the
court found that the plaintiffs risk of injury was reasonably foreseeable,
and affirmed the lower court's denial of defendants' post-trial motions,
upholding the jury verdicts finding the coaches liable for the plaintiffs in-
juries. 72 Moose demonstrates that college coaches, to be sure of meeting
the standard of care to their athletes, must provide them with proper
equipment and appropriately supervise them.73 Further, a coach's aware-
ness of a potential risk may help to establish that the harm from that par-
ticular risk was foreseeable.
Mogabgab is similar to the circumstances surrounding the deaths of
the Rashidi Wheeler at Northwestern University and Eraste Autin at the
University Florida. In Mogabgab, the parents of a high school football
player who died of heat stroke suffered during a practice brought a wrong-
ful death action against the school board and the coaches for having de-
layed medical treatment.7 4 The lower court dismissed the suit, apparently
because it was not satisfied that the delay in treatment caused Robert's
death. 5 On the plaintiffs' appeal, the appellate court reversed the dismissal
as to the school board and the coaches.76
In its ruling, the appeals court recited the coaches' failure to summon
medical aid for an unreasonable amount of time after the student, Robert
Mogabgab, staggered and became faint at practice.77 At 5:20 p.m. Robert
collapsed during "wind sprints," and teammates helped him onto the
school bus, which took him back to the school, arriving there at about 5:40
p.m.78 Robert vomited several times and showed other serious symptoms
of heat exhaustion, and the coaches vainly tried several methods of treat-
ment before finally calling Robert's mother at around 6:30 p.m.79 The
mother called a doctor, who arrived at the school at around 7:15 p.m., and
71. Id. at 710.
72. Id. at 711, 713.
73. The coach's duty, while substantial, is not absolute. See, e.g., Herring v. Bossier Parish
Sch. Bd., 632 So. 2d 920 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that a baseball coach satisfied his supervisory
duties by implementing proper procedures and routines for the conduct of practice). See generally
McCaskey and Biedzynski, supra note 42, at 23 (discussing the limits of a coach's supervisory obli-
gation).
74. Mogabgab, 239 So. 2d at 457.
75. Id. at 460.
76. Id. at 461.
77. Id. at 458-59.
78. Mogabgab, 239 So. 2d at 458-59.
79. Id. at 459. Witnesses stated that the player had vomited several times, his skin was clammy
and bluish-gray, and he was unresponsive. One coach attempted to revive the player with an ammo-
nia capsule. The head coach remained in his office for almost the entire period that the player was
stricken in the cafeteria. Id.
[Vol. 13
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had Robert taken to the hospital.8 ° Thus Robert did not receive proper
treatment for heat stroke until a doctor sent him to a hospital, about two
hours after he collapsed at practice; he died at the hospital some hours
later.81
As to the causation issue that had led to the lower court's dismissal of
the complaint, the appellate court then recited the expert medical evidence,
which showed that heat damage to the body is progressive, and that at
some point in the process it becomes irreversible, so that the sooner treat-
ment is given, the greater the patient's chances of survival are.82 Thus, it
was plain to the court that the coaches had been negligent in delaying
medical aid, and further, the plaintiffs had carried their burden of showing
causation, since they had shown it was more likely than not that Robert
would have survived if he had been given "reasonably prompt" medical
treatment.83 The court reversed the judgment as to the school board and
coaches, and awarded damages to the parents. 4
Prejean, Moose and Mogabgab provide the outlines of a general rule
regarding coaches' liability: Coaches must be aware of preventable risks to
their athletes and they must take measures to properly supervise and care
for their players. As suggested previously, plaintiffs shoulder a formidable
burden in establishing a coach's negligence in relation to these duties.
Prejean indicates that the coach's duty to players is not absolute. Moose
and Mogabgab are examples of coaches' serious inattention, ignorance,
and indifference to a player's well-being. It appears that a showing short
of such serious misconduct will probably not sustain a plaintiff's suit for a
coach's negligence.
B. Possible Defenses to an Injured Player's Negligence Claim
The preceding sections of this article have addressed the plaintiffs ef-
forts to establish a prima facie case of negligence. In addition to the ob-
stacles described therein, a plaintiff must also overcome several powerful
defenses that a coach may employ. Assumption of risk and qualified im-
munity are two of the most prominent defenses.
80. Id. at 459-60.
81. Id. at 458-59.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 460-61. It was not necessary for the plaintiffs to prove to a certainty that Robert
would have lived if he had seen a doctor sooner; causation, said the court, like other facts in a civil
case, requires only proof by a preponderance of evidence. Id. at 460.
84. Id. at 461.
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1. Assumption of Risk
The Restatement of Torts defines the doctrine of assumption of risk:
"A plaintiff who voluntarily assumes a risk of harm arising from the negli-
gent or reckless conduct of the defendant cannot recover for such harm."85
Assumption of risk can be express, as where the plaintiff gives her express
consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation to exercise care for her
protection, and agrees to take her chances as to injury from a known or
possible risk.86  Assumption of risk can also be implied, as where the
plaintiff voluntarily enters into some relation with the defendant which he
knows to involve the risk, and is therefore regarded as tacitly or impliedly
agreeing to relieve the defendant of responsibility, and to take her own
chances.87
The "primary" sense of implied assumption of risk is that of a plaintiff
who voluntarily enters a relationship with the defendant, knowing of risk
involved, and who behaves reasonably in assuming it.88 An example is
that of a spectator entering a baseball park. By his attendance, he impli-
edly assumes the risk of injury such that the players are not obligated to
take special precautions to protect him.89 This type of implied assumption
of risk is another way of stating that the defendant owes no duty to a plain-
tiff.90 The "secondary" sense of implied assumption of risk describes a
plaintiffs voluntary and unreasonable encountering of risk presented by a
defendant's negligence. 91 Thus a coach faced with a player's negligence
action will often assert that the plaintiff impliedly assumed the risks inher-
ent in the sport.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965). Stated in the more traditional way:
"Volenti non fit injuria," or no wrong is done to one who consents. Id. at cmt. b. A subjective stan-
dard is usually employed to determine whether the plaintiff assumed the risk. "The standard is
judged by what a particular plaintiff sees, understands and appreciates." J. Barton Goplerud, Liabil-
ity of Schools and Coaches: The Current Status of Sovereign Immunity and Assumption of the Risk,
39 DRAKE L. REv. 759, 769 (1989).
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (1965).
87. Id. § 496C.
88. See, e.g., Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., 837 P.2d 1273, 1290 (Haw. 1992).
89. Id. at 1291, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A cmt. c; Ordway v. Superior
Court, 198 Cal. App.3d 98, 105 (1988).
90. Larsen, 837 P.2d at 1290.
91. Id. at 1291, citing Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, 155 A.2d 90, 93 (1959);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A cmt. c (1965). In many jurisdictions the plaintiffs pri-
mary, or reasonable, assumption of a risk is a complete defense to a claim of negligence, while sec-
ondary, or unreasonable, assumption of risk has merged with comparative negligence to reduce a
plaintiffs recovery, for example in products liability cases. Larsen, 837 P.2d at 1292; Knight v.
Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 706-711 (Cal. 1992).
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a. Implied Assumption of Risk and the Inherent Risk of the
Activity
The primary assumption of risk defense proved successful in the recent
case of Foronda v. Hawaii International Boxing Club.92 In Foronda,
plaintiffs were the parents of an amateur boxer who died after sparring un-
der the supervision of his coach.93 During the match, the boxer received a
blow that caused him to sit on and lean against the ropes surrounding the
ring. 9 He slipped through the ropes and fell to the floor, striking his
head.95 Despite protective headgear, he suffered a severe traumatic intra-
cranial injury, and died three days later.96 The plaintiffs sued the owner
and operator of the boxing ring, claiming negligent construction and main-
tenance of the ring and negligent supervision.97 The lower court granted
the defendants' summary judgment motion, holding that the deceased had
assumed the risk inherent in the sport of boxing.98 The appellate court af-
firmed.99
The court emphasized the importance of the doctrine of primary im-
plied assumption of risk in the sports context,'00 and held that it is a com-
plete defense where the defendant's conduct is an inherent risk of the
sports activity.'0 ' To assess the inherent risk, the court said, it should con-
sider "the nature of the activity, the relationship of the defendant to the ac-
tivity and the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff."' 02 With re-
spect to boxing, said the court, the inherent risks are extreme, since the
participants aim at injuring their opponents in ways that in any other con-
text would be criminal;'0 3 "[b]oxing is a savage sport, with inherent perils
commensurate with its nature."'' 0 4 Furthermore, the court noted that the
deceased boxer in this case was an experienced amateur, who had signed
92. 25 P.3d 826 (Haw. Ct. App. 2001).
93. Id. at 828-30.
94. Id. at 829.
95. Id.
96. Foronda, 25 P.3d at 830.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 828.
99. Id.
100. Foronda, 25 P.3d at 838. "The policy underlying [the primary assumption of risk defense
in the sports context] is 'the belief that the law should not place unreasonable burdens on the free and
vigorous participation in sports."' Id., quoting Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 968 (N.Y. 1986).
101. Id. at 841. It is not an affirmative defense to be proved by the defendant, but rather an "al-
ternate expression for the proposition that the defendant was not negligent." Id., quoting Meistrich,
155 A.2d at 93.
102. Id. at 841.
103. Id.
104. Foronda, 25 P.3d at 845.
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three waivers of liability during his career 0 5 and was well aware of the
inherent risks of "being hit hard in the stomach, suffering head injury from
punches, hitting his head on the padded canvas, leaning against the ropes
for some time without help from his coach or trainer, and falling backward
through a properly built ring and thereby suffering injury."' 6 In affirming
the lower court's judgment, the court held that the deceased "assumed the
risk that coaching and supervision cannot guarantee against injury while
boxing."10 7 Therefore primary implied assumption of risk provided a com-
plete defense to the plaintiffs' claims.'0 8
Balthazor v. Little League Baseball, Inc.,'0 9 also addressed the primary
implied assumption of risk in relation to an eleven-year old baseball
player. When the player was struck in the face by a wild pitch in a Little
League game, he and his mother sued the league and claimed that it had
"breached its duty not to increase the risks inherent in baseball."" 0 The
trial court granted summary judgment to the league, concluding that re-
covery was barred by primary implied assumption of risk."' The appellate
court affirmed."'
As in Foronda, the appellate court stated that to determine whether a
defendant in a sports case has increased the risks to a participant beyond
those inherent in the sport, a court must examine "the nature of the activity
or sport in which the defendant is engaged and the relationship of the de-
fendant and the plaintiff to that activity or sport.""' 3  Since the Little
League had supervisory control over the young player, the court looked at
105. Id. at 831-32. The lower court did not consider these waivers as valid contractual releases
or waivers but rather as evidence of the implied assumption of the risk by the deceased. The appel-
late court implicitly agreed with that analysis. Id. at 841 n.2.
106. Id. at 842. Plaintiffs conceded that the deceased had assumed the risk of boxing, but they
attempted to argue that the he had not assumed the risk of a hazardous condition in the ring, i.e., that
the ring ropes were too loose. Id. The appellate court agreed with the lower court that there were no
facts in the case to show that the owner-operator of the ring and the coaches had done anything to
increase the risks beyond those that inherent in the sport. Id. at 843-45.
107. Id. at 845.
108. Foronda, 25 P.3d at 845.
109. 62 Cal. App. 4th 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
110. Id. at 48, 51. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that the league had failed to provide adequate
lighting for the game played at dusk, failed to remove the pitcher after he had struck two earlier bat-
ters with wild pitches, and failed to provide helmets with faceguards. Id. at 51-52. Plaintiffs at-
tempted to apply the doctrine of secondary implied assumption of risk. Id. at 48.
111. Id. at 49.
112. ld. at 53.
113. Balthazor, 62 Cal. App. 4th at 50, quoting Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992). In
Knight the court said that it was "improper to hold a sports participant liable to a coparticipant for
ordinary careless conduct committed during the sport - for example, for an injury resulting from a
carelessly thrown ball or bat during a baseball game." Knight, 834 P.2d at 706.
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cases involving instructors rather than those involving coparticipants.I 4
Only in cases where an instructor is found to have acted "so as to increase
the risk of harm inherent in a particular sport" is that instructor deprived of
the defense of primary assumption of risk.'. The court held that the Little
League had not increased the normal risks of baseball, either by failing to
end the game as sunset approached (since changes in lighting conditions
are inherent in baseball), or by failing to remove the "wild pitcher" from
the game, since to require accuracy of a pitcher would "alter the funda-
mental nature of the game and most certainly chill vigorous participa-
tion."' 16 Finally, the League had no duty to reduce the risk of injury by
providing helmets with faceguards, since a defendant in such a case has no
duty to decrease the risks inherent in baseball."'
b. Implied Assumption of Risk and the Plaintiff's Knowledge or
Experience
While Foranda and Balthazor based the assumption of risk on the in-
herent danger of the sport, other cases emphasized the plaintiffs knowl-
edge or experience. In Vendrell v. School District No. 26C,"8 the Oregon
Supreme Court absolved a school district from liability because of the
plaintiffs prior experience in the sport. In Vendrell, the plaintiff was a
high school football player who sued his school district for neck injuries
he sustained when he was tackled in a football game." 9 He received a
substantial judgment in lower court and the school district appealed. 2 ° On
appeal, the issue was whether the plaintiffs injury resulted from a failure
by the coach to provide adequate instruction and supervision.' 2 '
The appellate court reversed the judgment. Despite the plaintiffs
youth, 22 the court said he had "undergone extensive training, practice and
114. Balthazor, 62 Cal. App. 4th at 50.
115. Id. at 51, quoting Fortier v. Los Rios Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 Cal. App. 4th 430, 436 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996). For example, the court cited Galardi v. Seahorse Riding Club, 16 Cal. App. 4th 817,
819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (no primary assumption of risk defense was available where a riding in-
structor directed his student to "jump his horse over fences that were unreasonably and unnecessarily
high for the circumstances").
116. Id. at 51-52. Balthazor's injury was "simply a result of an inherent risk in the sport." Id. at
52.
117. Id.
118. 376 P.2d 406 (Or. 1962).
119. Id. at 408, 409. The plaintiff, alleging acts of negligence by his coaches, apparently sued
the school district only, based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. at 408.
120. Id. at 407.
121. Id. at 408-09.
122. At the time of the injury the plaintiff was fifteen years old. Vendrell, 376 P.2d at 409.
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play under competent instruction and supervision.123 The coaches em-
ployed by the defendant school district had supplied the athletes with the
proper protective equipment and provided adequate instruction regarding
the use of the equipment in the sport. 124 The coaches, said the court, "had
the right to assume that [the plaintiff] possessed the intelligence and stock
of information of a normal young man.., and that he knew of the possi-
bility of injury" involved in the violent sport of football.'25 The court con-
cluded that the plaintiff, based on his extensive participation and experi-
ence in the sport, assumed the 'obvious' risk attendant upon being
tackled. 26  Accordingly, the court held that the judgment in favor of the
plaintiff should be reversed.'27
Thus, in considering whether a plaintiff impliedly assumed the risk,
the courts may make a largely subjective inquiry or a largely objective
one. In Foronda and Balthazor, the courts analyzed the plaintiff's implied
assumption of risk based largely on an objective standard arising from the
obvious risks of the sports involved-boxing is obviously an inherently
risky sport; a baseball player may obviously be struck by a wild pitch.'28
On the other hand, the court in Vendrell conducted a partially subjective
inquiry, based on the plaintiffs experience in the sport and his awareness
of the risks involved in playing it. Under that analysis, the more experi-
ence the plaintiff has in the sport, the more likely it is that he made an in-
formed judgment regarding the inherent risks. The stakes are high in this
determination, since primary implied assumption of risk completely bars a
123. Id. at 410. The plaintiff had participated for two years at the junior high school level. Id.
He had undergone physical examinations and practiced football eight hours a week. Id. at 409. The
training included substantial calisthenics and conditioning, with particular exercises to strengthen the
neck and instruction in the proper positioning of the head and neck during contact. Id. at 410.
124. Id. at 411-13.
125. Id. at 414.
126. Vendrell, 476 P.2d at 414. The court cited PROSSER ON TORTS and the American Legal
Reporter for the proposition that a participant in a lawful contest assumes the inherent risk in the
game and is barred from recovery for injury therefrom. "The timorous may stay at home." Id.
127. Vendrell, 476 P.2d at 414. See also Hale v. Davies, 70 S.E.2d 923, 925 (Ga. Ct. App. 1952)
(high school football coach was not liable for the injuries of a player, where the player was a sixteen-
year-old normal boy of "average intelligence" who assumed the risk of being injured while engaging
in the practice or play of football). The skill and experience of an injured high school football player
was also part of the assessment of his assumption of risk in Benitez v. N Y. City Board of Education,
543 N.Y.S. 2d 29, 33 (N.Y. 1989).
128. The court in Foronda made the importance of the objective standard explicit: "What the
particular plaintiff knew or did not know about the risks of the sport cannot be controlling. The very
concept of inherent risk implies indwelling risk independent of the participant's subjective knowl-
edge or perception of it .... The inquiry is an objective one, and must be, for the vagaries of prior
knowledge or perception of risk would undermine the doctrine's underlying policy, that 'the law
should not place unreasonable burdens on the free and vigorous participation in sports."' Foronda,
25 P.3d at 842.
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plaintiff s claim.'29
2. Qualified Immunity
A coach who is employed by a public entity may also seek to avoid li-
ability by invoking qualified immunity, a protection for government em-
ployees that derives from the doctrine of sovereign immunity. At common
law sovereign immunity precludes suits against the government without its
consent, but it has been limited and waived at least partially by state and
federal statutes. Likewise under the common law, qualified immunity has
generally protected public employees from personal liability for damages
arising from their "discretionary" acts, as opposed to "ministerial func-
tions," taken in good faith within the scope of their authority. 30 Tradition-
ally, therefore, one question for a court to answer in determining whether a
governmental employee is shielded from suit by qualified immunity is
whether the act or omission complained of can be said to be "discretion-
ary." That was the crux of the appeal in Gasper v. Freidel."'
In Gasper, the plaintiff was a football player at a public high school
who was injured in off-season conditioning drills. 3 2  Gasper sued his
coaches, the school superintendent, and the school board, asserting that the
defendants maintained "an unauthorized and unlawful conditioning pro-
129. The defense of comparative negligence may also be used in addition to that of assumption
of risk. However, in the school context, "assumption of risk appears to be the more prominent [de-
fense], if not the more successful." McCaskey and Biedzynski, supra note 43, at n.232, quoting
Eugene C. Bjorklun, Assumption of Risk and Its Effect on School Liability for Athletic Injuries, 55
EDUC. L.REP. 349, 350 (1989).
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D cmts. d, f(1979). Some statutes, in providing
for a partial waiver of sovereign immunity, and for protection of its employees from personal liabil-
ity, abolish the distinction between "discretionary" and "ministerial" functions. For example, the
Florida statute providing for a limited recovery from the state for torts committed by state officers
includes a provision precluding personal liability of state officers and employees for injuries or dam-
age suffered as a result of acts taken in the scope of employment, except for those taken "in bad faith
or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights,
safety, or property." FLA. STAT. ANN. §768.28(9)(a) (West 2000). All other claims are to be
brought directly against the relevant state entity. Id. The view that qualified immunity should apply
to all state employees, regardless of the nature of the duties involved in the complained-of acts or
omissions, "is based upon the difficulties courts encounter in making so-called arbitrary distinctions
between discretionary and ministerial functions, and upon the premise that it is unfair to withhold
official privilege from any governmental employee whose actions were taken reasonably and in good
faith." Kathryn Dix Sowle, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unresolved Issues of the
Conditions for its Use and the Burden of Persuasion,'55 TUL. L. REV. 326, 355 (1981), citing W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 1990-91 (4th ed. 1971). The Restatement notes that as
to what is a discretionary function, "[t]he cases are legion and are in wide disarray ......
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D cmt. d (1979).
131. 450 N.W.2d 226 (S.D. 1990).
132. Id. at 228.
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gram without proper supervision" on school grounds. 13 3 The lower court
granted the defendants' summary judgment motions based on the doctrine
of sovereign immunity,134 which, at the time of the accident, extended
broadly to protect school districts and their officers "if they did not act in
excess of their lawful authority or commit intentional torts. ' 135 The issue
before the South Dakota Supreme Court was whether sovereign immunity
shielded the coaches from liability when a student is injured in a summer
weight-conditioning program; 136 under South Dakota law the resolution of
that issue turned on whether the coaches' conduct in relation to that pro-
gram (1) was within the scope of their employment; (2) was grossly negli-
gent; and (3) involved a "discretionary" or "ministerial" function.'37
The court held that the summer conditioning program, being part of
the coaches' twelve-month contract, was conducted within the scope of
their employment, and that the coaches' supervision of the program was
not grossly negligent. 138 As to whether the actions taken by the coaches in
carrying out the program were discretionary or ministerial, the court
looked at factors laid out in the Second Restatement of Torts.'39 The court
concluded that the imposition of liability on the coaches in these circum-
stances would "impair the free exercise of discretion" in the carrying out
of a coach's duties, in this case the "important function of conditioning
student/athletes for all sports.', 40 "No person will want to be a coach if his
133. Id. The plaintiff admitted that he had been instructed in the proper use of the weight-lifting
equipment, including the necessity of requesting spotters when lifting heavy weights, but that he had
ignored instructions and lifted 335 pounds from the squat rack without spotters, warm-up, or a prop-
erly fitting weight belt. Id.
134. Id.
135. Gasper, 450 N.W.2d at 229. Some time after the Gasper accident, the South Dakota Legis-
lature passed a statute providing for waiver of sovereign immunity by school districts if they bought
liability insurance. Id. at 229 n.*.
136. Id. at 229.
137. Id. at 231. "Generally, discretionary acts require the exercise of judgment, whereas minis-
terial acts involve the implementation of the judgment decisions of others." Id. at 234 (Sabers, J.,
concurring).
138. Id.
139. The court summarized the Restatement factors as follows:
The nature and importance of the function that the officer is performing....
The extent to which passing judgment on the exercise of discretion by the officer will amount
necessarily to passing judgment by the court on the conduct of a coordinate branch of govern-
ment....
The extent to which the ultimate financial responsibility will fall on the officer ....
The likelihood that harm will result to members of the public if the action is taken ....
The nature and seriousness of the type of harm that may be produced....
The availability to the injured party of other remedies and other forms of relief.
Gasper, 450 N.W.2d at 230, quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D cmt. f (1979).
140. Gasper, 450 N.W.2d at 232.
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or her judgment in supervising athletic training is continually open to law-
suits."'' Furthermore, the court did not want to be in the position of hav-
ing to decide whether "the string of athletic injuries that occur every year
are the result of coaching negligence.' ' 4' Thus the court decided that the
coaches were entitled to summary judgment under the discretionary func-
tion test for sovereign immunity.
4 1
The Alabama Supreme Court applied a similar analysis in Lennon v.
Petersen. 44 The plaintiff in Lennon, a recipient of a soccer scholarship at
the University of Alabama, experienced pain in the hip and groin area
while practicing at the beginning of his first season. 4 The athletic trainer
treated him for groin strain, but the pain persisted, and when the plaintiff
went home in mid-November and sought medical treatment, he was diag-
nosed and treated for avascular necrosis. 4 6 The plaintiff sued his coach
and athletic trainer for negligence, arguing that they were not entitled to
discretionary immunity for their allegedly negligent treatment of his condi-
tion, since they had exceeded their authority under the law - the coach be-
cause he had "discouraged players from seeking treatment for their inju-
ries," and the athletic trainer because she had treated him for injury
without a license to practice medicine.
47
The Alabama Supreme Court, like the South Dakota Supreme Court in
Gasper, looked to the Restatement of Torts to define the extent of immu-
nity of public employees: "A public officer acting within the general scope
of his authority is not subject to tort liability for an administrative act or
omission if ... he is immune because engaged in the exercise of a discre-
tionary function."' 48 The court noted that since "discretionary function" is
not expressly defined, the Restatement factors are used for making a de-
termination. 41 "A discretionary function does not include ministerial tasks
like the mere filling out of a form, nor does it include acts made 'fraudu-
lently, in bad faith, beyond [the actor's] authority, or ... under a mistaken
interpretation of the law."'15  Furthermore, the court said, discretionary




144. 624 So. 2d 171 (Ala. 1993).
145. Id. at 173.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Lennon, 624 So. 2d at 173, quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395D(3)(a)
(1965).
149. Lennon, 624 So. 2d at 173; supra n.139.
150. Lennon, 624 So. 2d at 173, quoting Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297 (Ala. 1993).
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"the ability of public officers to engage in making a decision by weighing
the policies for and against it."''
The court concluded that both the trainer and the coach had acted
within their authority and that the complained-of actions had clearly been
discretionary, since they required decision-making and the use of judg-
ment."5 2 The coach, entrusted with the authority inherent in his coaching
job, among other things "had to make difficult decisions in determining
whether a player was injured and should report to the trainer or whether
the player was merely faking an injury to avoid practice..."' 3 The trainer,
likewise, acting within the authority applicable to athletic trainers at the
time of the filing of plaintiff's complaint, was responsible for determining
whether an athlete needed medical attention and when he should be al-
lowed to return to the field. 54 Both jobs required the exercise of judgment
and discretion; thus the court held that both the coach and the athletic
trainer were entitled to discretionary-function immunity. 5'
The Mississippi Supreme Court addressed the issue of qualified im-
munity in a negligence action for heatstroke injuries against two high
school football coaches in Prince v. Louisville Municipal School Dis-
trict.'56 Since the case arose before Mississippi arrived at a scheme pro-
viding for a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, the court had to decide
the immunity issue under the common law, which required a finding of
whether the complained-of act involved a discretionary function or a min-
isterial one.'57 The court quoted from the description of a coach's duties
made by the court in Lennon, and said that likewise in the case before it, a
coach carrying out his responsibility for supervising the football program
and maintaining good order and discipline "must use his discretion in
judging whether or not an individual player is injured and then whether the
player should report to a trainer or seek other medical aid."' 58 Since the
plaintiff had produced no evidence of "disregard for his health or any other
outrageous action," the coaches were protected from personal liability by
151. Lennon, 624 So. 2d at 174 (citing cases).
152. Id. at 174-75.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Lennon, 624 So. 2d at 175.
156. 741 So. 2d 207 (Miss. 1999).
157. Id. at 210. In the statutory scheme defining the extent of sovereign immunity and providing
for a limited remedy for injuries caused by the state and its employees, the Mississippi Legislature
has abrogated the distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts. Public employees are not to
be liable for acts done by them within the course and scope of their employment, as long as such acts
do not constitute "fraud, malice, libel, slander, defamation or any criminal offense." MISs. CODE
ANN. § 11-46-7 (2002).
158. Prince, 741 So. 2d at 212.
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qualified immunity.'59
Thus, under the common law coaches acting within the scope of their
employment in tasks requiring the exercise of discretion are largely
shielded from personal liability by qualified immunity. Furthermore,
modem statutes waiving sovereign immunity may provide sweeping im-
munity from personal liability for public employees, with respect to all but
certain narrow categories of outrageous or illegal acts.
3. Volunteer Statutes
Several states have enacted "volunteer statutes" to protect certain per-
sons, such as volunteer Little League and youth soccer coaches, from li-
ability for injuries arising from their simple negligence in connection with
their coaching activities. Such statutes are designed to provide varying
degrees of tort immunity for volunteers where neither no other immunity
for them would be available, such as sovereign immunity or charitable
immunity. 160
Most volunteer statutes apply only to coaches or officials who serve as
volunteers without compensation in activities benefiting young people, and
do not provide immunity for willful or wanton negligence. Some statutes
require that in order to enjoy the immunity a coach must undergo approved
safety training.1 61 Others specifically exclude negligence arising from the
operation of a motor vehicle. 62 The general trend seems to be toward en-
couraging participation in volunteer coaching by lessening the risk of in-
curring liability for mere negligent acts committed during coaching activi-
ties.
III. CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
Under extreme circumstances an injured athlete playing for a public
institution may also pursue a federal civil rights claim against his coach
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.163 In Roventini v. Pasadena Independent School
159. Id.
160. For examples of various approaches to providing immunity for volunteer coaches and other
volunteer service providers, see, e.g., COLO.REv. STAT. § 13-21-116 (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-
1-41 (2002); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80/1 (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-30-19-1 to -4
(West 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85V (West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-6 (West
2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-12-1 (Michie 1996); N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03-46 (2001); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 8332.1 (2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-48 (2002).
161. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2798 (West 2002); N.J. STAT ANN. § 2A:62A-6 (West 2003).
162. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-48 (2002).
163. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (2001) reads (in part):
Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State ... subjects any citizen of the
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District'64 a district court judge discussed the standard for a claim brought
under § 1983 that an athlete at a public institution was deprived by his
coaches of life without due process of law.'65 The plaintiffs in Roventini,
parents of a high school student who died of heat stroke after a school
football practice, alleged that their son had been subjected to grueling hot-
weather exercise by the school's football coaches, who deliberately ig-
nored the player's symptoms of dehydration and failed to seek medical
care for him.166 The plaintiffs sued the school district, the coaches, and
other officials under § 1983 for violating their son's "constitutional rights
to life, liberty, health, safety, and bodily integrity and to a safe environ-
ment protecting him from violations of his rights by state actors.' 67
The court noted that such a § 1983 claim must allege egregious mis-
conduct on the part of a coach, since "not every personal hurt by a state of-
ficer constitutes a violation of the fourteenth amendment."' 68 Under Fifth
Circuit and United States Supreme Court precedent, the Fourteenth
Amendment is violated when a schoolchild is deprived of his bodily integ-
rity or life by the "callous indifference of public school officials," in this
case by being "run to death" by coaches in an overly strenuous practice
session and then by being denied water, rest, and medical attention.'69
Thus the court held that allegations of such conduct, which would be
"grossly disproportionate" to the demands of coaching a high school foot-
ball team, stated a claim under § 1983 against all defendants, if such con-
duct was alleged to be inspired by "deliberate indifference and callous dis-
regard" for the players' constitutional rights. 70
IV. CONCLUSION
A. Coach Green Is Probably Not Liable for the Death of Korey Stringer
Coach Dennis Green of the Minnesota Vikings is in the same position
as that of the coaches of the professional athletes in Ellis v. Rocky Moun-
United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law.
164. Roventini, 981 F.Supp. 1013 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
165. Id. at 1017-1023.
166. Id. at 1016. The allegations were later withdrawn and the complaint was dismissed.
Roventini v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 183 F.R.D. 500 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
167. Roventini, 981 F. Supp. at 1016.
168. Id. at 1020.
169. Id. at 1019.
170. Id. at 1020. The court let stand the claims against all defendants except those sued only in
their official capacities. Id. at 1015.
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tain Empire Sports, Inc.,'71 and Bayless v. Philadelphia National League
Club,72 which demonstrate society's strong preference for arbitration and
workers' compensation over litigation in the employment context. Profes-
sional coaches are generally protected against lawsuits for deaths and inju-
ries of players in all cases but those involving intentional torts or extreme
negligence. In the case of Korey Stringer's unfortunate death, it is fairly
clear that Green is shielded from personal liability. Professional football
teams usually practice in the extreme heat of summer. Green conducted
summer practices that were no harsher than those of other professional
teams in hotter regions, such as Dallas or Miami. Stringer was a veteran
of the team and its training camps. He was familiar with the routine and
was aware of the expectations of the coaching staff and organization. His
case seems to have been aberrational, an extreme reaction to an otherwise
nornal practice session. Since there is no evidence that Green acted inten-
tionally to inflict injury on Stringer or that he acted outside the scope of
his employment as a head coach, Stringer's death probably falls squarely
in the auspices of the arbitration clause and the Minnesota Workers' Com-
pensation Statute.
B. Coach Spurrier and Coach Walker Would Probably Not Be Held
Liable for the Deaths of Their Athletes
Coach Spurrier (University of Florida) and Coach Walker (Northwest-
ern University) face different liability issues. Collegiate players are not
considered 'employees,' so they have no professional player contracts and
no workers' compensation coverage. Many coaches' status and huge sala-
ries make them obvious targets for suits brought for the deaths of colle-
giate players, suits that would most likely be based on alleged negligence
regarding supervision or instruction.
As discussed above, it is well-established that a coach has a duty to
protect his players from foreseeable risks, but it is not always clear what
the exact limits of that duty are. Should Coach Spurrier or Coach Walker
be held to the standard of a football coach unskilled in medical diagnosis?
If they are held to a higher standard of care, where is the line drawn? Even
if a coach is held to a higher standard of awareness regarding his athletes,
it is impossible for a coach to recognize all possible health issues facing
his players. A college football coach such as Spurrier or Walker is respon-
sible for more than sixty players, and delegates much responsibility for
athletes' health concerns to a staff of skilled trainers and physicians. It is
171. 602 P.2d 895 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979).
172. 472 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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unrealistic to expect the coaches' knowledge of medical issues to extend
far beyond the standard of a reasonable observer.
Even if the applicable standard of care is identified, a plaintiff faces a
huge task in establishing the other elements of negligence. Both Autin and
Wheeler died after participating in normal summer practices that precede
every football season. At the usual college football practice, trainers are
present, water is readily available, and players are instructed to inform the
staff if they experience a health problem. If such precautions were ob-
served, it would be exceedingly difficult to prove the foreseeability of the
death of a young athlete at the height of his physical capabilities.
Such plaintiffs would also have to content with the defenses available
to the coaches. The doctrine of assumption of risk would be a formidable
barrier to such suits. As discussed above, cases such as Foronda v. Ha-
waii hIternational Boxing Club, Balthazor v. Little League Baseball, and
Vendrell v. School District No. 26C show that an athlete's participation in
an inherently risky sport, coupled with the awareness of these risks, will
probably preclude recovery in a tort action.
It is obvious that football is a brutal and violent sport. Severe injuries
are common and games are played in a variety of weather conditions. 17 3 In
all areas of the country and at all levels of participation, the football season
begins in the "dog days" of summer and finishes in the dead of winter.
Weather conditions are a component of the game 1 4 and, as such, are in-
herent risks of the sport. While heat stroke and heat exhaustion are not
common occurrences among highly trained and conditioned athletes, they
are not rare either.
Both Autin and Wheeler had played football for a number of years be-
fore starting to play college football. hey were top performers in the sport
in elite football programs. They had played and practiced in hundreds of
events in their young lives, and had probably watched many more. Given
their familiarity with the sport, Spurrier and Walker can probably assert
the complete defense of implied assumption of risk.175
173. Unlike many other sports, a football game is rarely, if ever, cancelled because of inclement
conditions.
174. Coaches often complain that their players become winded when playing in the thin air of
Denver. Players in Miami are better acclimated to warm weather than visiting opponents from cooler
climes. Conversely, the Tampa Bay Buccaneers, a Florida professional football team, have never
won a game when the temperature at game time is less than forty degrees. Katherine Smith, Bucs
Can't Shed Cold-Weather Loser Tag, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 1, 2001, at 7.
175. In the case of Rasheedi Wheeler, there may also be issues of comparative negligence asso-
ciated with his asthma condition and alleged use of a performance-enhancing supplement. Lance
Pugmire, Wheeler Family Hires Cochran, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 14, 2001, at Sports 1. Witnesses appar-
ently said that Wheeler had taken a controversial supplement, ephedrine, prior to the fateful practice.
Id. Additionally, Wheeler died with a bronchial inhaler in his hand, suggesting that he was aware of
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Coach Spurrier, on the basis of his employment at a public university,
may also employ the defense of qualified immunity. As discussed above,
under the traditional view, Spurrier, having been entrusted with tasks that
would be considered "discretionary," would be protected from liability for
injuries alleged to arise from simple negligence. Being in charge of the
overall supervision of the football program and the players, he coordinates
the practices, plans the strategies, and keeps track of his players' injuries.
He must use his discretion to determine the best manner to employ indi-
vidual talents and how the injuries affect the team. Under the view of the
modem statutory waivers of sovereign immunity, such an employee is usu-
ally protected from personal liability save for outrageous acts.
Thus it is very difficult for an athlete to sue a coach for injuries sus-
tained while participating in a sport. It is a hurdle merely to establish a
prima facie case of negligence, not to mention the defenses of assumption
of the risk, comparative negligence, and various forms of immunity that a
coach may assert. While some cases show that a plaintiff may succeed
where facts going to extreme disregard for a player's safety are shown,
courts have been generally hesitant to find liability, on the general princi-
ple that "the law should not place unreasonable burdens on the free and
vigorous participation in sports.' 7 6 In addition, there is widespread re-
spect and affection for high-status football coaches such as Green, Spur-
rier, and Walker. It would probably be hard to find a jury that would find
such a coach liable for a death that occurred as a result of anything but
truly wanton conduct. For these reasons, the families of Korey Stringer,
Rashidi Wheeler, and Eraste Autin would face limited prospects in recov-
ering damages from their coaches.
his condition and knew that it was aggravated by intense physical exertion. Id.
176. Foronda, 25 P.3d at 842.
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